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It is a distinct pleasure to submit this comparative and linguistic study 
to a volume in honor of Shlomo Dov Goitein whose scholarly work did 
so much to illumine the life of Jewish communities in the Arab world. 
The present study seeks to probe the impact of one particular Hellenistic 
philosophy on a Jewish intellectual of the third century B.C.E. whose 
work was destined to become part of the sacred scripture of his own 
people as well as of the people of a daughter religion. 
Over fifty years ago Galling (1932, p. 276) identified four mam 
questions among researchers in Qoheleth: 
(I) How should one read the theme of the book and understand its 
arrangement? (2) Are the "I-sayings" signs of an autobiography, and can 
they be coordinated with "historical allusions"? (3) Do there exist con-
nections between Qoheleth's wisdom and the wisdom literature of the 
ancient near East? and (4) Has Greek philosophy been worked into the 
book? (My translation) 
By and large the same basic questions have continued to dominate in 
the research since Galling. A fairly thorough survey of research on 
Qoheleth by James Crenshaw may be found in a recent issue of the 
Hebrew Annual Review (1983, pp. 41-56). Accordingly, a selective 
update in response to the questions in Galling's earlier essay may serve 
as an introduction to the present inquiry. 
(I) On the issue of arrangement, Zimmerli (1974) has convincingly 
shown there is a greater coherence among the various sentences than 
Galling was inclined to accept; Loader (l 979) has identified "polarities" 
within the book and has demonstrated its dynamic unity on the basis of 
their presence, whereas Wright (1968) and Murphy (1981) have focused 
on key phrases as a means of establishing its formal unity. Braun (l 973, 
pp. 165, 179), Hengel (1974, vol. 1, p. 115; vol. 2, p. 77, n. 2) and others 
have continued to see in the book a work akin to the Stoic-Cynic 
diatribe. Some have seen only part of the work to be a "royal fiction" 
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(Braun, 1973, p. 163; Loader, 1979, pp. 19-20), whereas others have 
argued that the entire work should be viewed as a "royal testament" 
(Loretz, 1964, p. 161; von Rad, 1970, pp. 292-293; Crenshaw, 1981, 
p. 141). On the issue of theme, Gordis rightly observed: "any restate-
ment becomes a distortion" (1971, p. 125). Gordis, in conjunction with 
rabbinic and medieval Jewish authorities, sees the basic theme of the 
book to be sim/:zii, the enjoyment of life (1971, p. 131); Crenshaw, on the 
other hand, identifies five major convictions of our author (death, limits 
of wisdom, unknowability of God, perversity in the world and limited 
commendation of pleasure), but focuses on his skepticism and loss of 
trust in God (1981, pp. 128-144, 190-211). Hengel (1974, vol. 1, p. 126) 
similarly sees a conjoining of themes (joy, the course of time and the 
inescapability of death, with the latter occupying "the central point of 
his thought"). On the other hand, arguments against pressing Qoheleth 
into a pessimistic or fatalistic mode are given by Loretz (1964, pp. 247-
277), Zimmerli (1962, pp. 134-139)1 and Terrien (1978, pp. 373-380).2 
In contrast to Gordis and Terrien, Lauha (1978, passim) is inclined to 
press the more pessimistic assessment of the theme of the work. 
(2) In addition to the royal fiction or royal testament and self-
discourse (=Galling's /ch-Aussagen), various other sub-genres have been 
identified. Thus, in addition, Loader further identifies the maxim, the 
!ob saying, the comparison, the metaphor (sic), the parable, the allegory, 
the observation, woe-saying, benediction, antilogion, rhetorical question, 
admonition and self-discourse (1979, pp. 18-27). On the other hand, 
Braun sees three main (and broader) sub-genres: meditative reflection, 
meditation and instruction (1973, passim). 
There is also a marked tendency among recent critics and com-
mentators to minimize the amount of editorial activity in the book. See, 
e.g., the work of Wright and Murphy. Gordis is able to affirm the 
essential unity of the book by reviving an older theory of the author's 
use of quotations (1971, pp. 95-108); Braun sees the work as an 
anthology of Qoheleth's and of old sayings in the style of popular Greek 
philosophy (1973, p. 166); and A. Lauha (1978, pp. 5-7) posits that only 
redactors were operative: R 1 was responsible for the superscription in 
I: 1, the introduction of the Leitwort in I :2, its reappearance in 12:8, the 
colophon in 12:9-11 and the insertion of 1:3-11 as a prologue; to the 
second, orthodox redactor he assigns only 2:26a, ba; 3: l 7a; 5: Id; 7:26b; 
I. In addition to the "Schulthemata" common to wisdom (joy, work, possession of 
property, wife) Zimmerli points to Qoheleth's creation theology and God's gift of time. 
2. Terrien stresses Qoheleth 's modest doubt, theocentricity and deep faith: "In an age 
of the death of the gods, he was able to affirm God's presence in silence" (p. 379). 
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8: 12b, 13; 11 :9b; and the conclusion, 12: 12-14. An assessment similar, 
but not identical, to Lauha's is made by Crenshaw (1981, p. 146). On the 
different question of possible historical allusions, speculation continues 
(Schunck, 1959; Hengel, 1974, vol. I, p. 130). 
(3) Recent studies have been conducted in the near eastern back-
ground of the book (Loretz, 1964, pp. 57-134) and (4) on its Greek 
background (Braun, 1973, pp. 14-171; Hengel, 1974, vol. 1, pp. 115-128; 
and Lohfink, 1980, passim), 3 as well as on its date (Whitley, 1979, 
pp. 123-146).4 It may be established that Qoheleth did not remain 
unaffected by gnomic utterances of the Greeks (especially those of 
Hesiod and Theognis), by Greek philosophical discussion (especially 
that of the Skeptics and Cynics) and by Greek attitudes toward nature 
(especially those of the Stoics). It is the purpose of the present paper to 
explore further the relation of Qoheleth to Stoic thought and attitudes. 
Before turning to this subject, however, a word more may be said 
about Galling's item no. 2, namely, the significance of the "I-sayings" 
and the attempt to isolate the autobiographical utterances and their 
possible historical background. Galling ( 1932, pp. 280-281) rightly 
observed that it is impossible to differentiate the extent to which the 
utterances of Qoheleth reflect actual experiences of the author or past 
observations which accorded with his own. 5 Moreover, Galling was 
correct in my judgment in following Volz (1921, p. 236) and seeing in 
the book of Qoheleth an autobiographical basis of the ancient sage's 
reflections. Even though that basis may not be clearly recoverable, we 
encounter in Qoheleth not simply fiction, but the flesh and blood 
wrestlings with doubt and agnosticism of a "son of David" who lived-
probably "in Jerusalem" (Qoh 1:1). 
3. Braun's list of Greek parallels is the most exhaustive assembled to date. Hengel 
focuses on affinities between Qoheleth and the New Comedy and Greek epitaphs. Twenty 
selective instances of Greek influences on Qoheleth elicited from Lohfink's commentary 
are conveniently listed by Crenshaw (1983, pp. 49-50). 
It may be appropriate to note here that, with one or two exceptions, the affinities and 
parallels set forth below in this essay between Qoheleth and the Stoics from before the 
common era are taken from neither Braun nor Hengel nor Lohfink nor previous studies. 
To my knowledge the present essay also explores fresh ground in its inquiry into possible 
anti-Stoicism in Qoheleth. 
4. Whitley argues (unsuccessfully, in my judgment) for a mid-second century B.C.E. 
date. For some of my reasons for this judgment, see Gordis (1971, pp. 46-50, 59-88), 
Hengel (1974, vol. 1, pp. 115-116) and Schunck (1959). 
5. Galling (1932, pp. 280-281) said, with respect to the Solomonic fiction of the 
author: "Wohl steht sein Leben dahinter, aber uns nicht mehr biographisch fassbar: es 
eignet sich Situationen zu, die seiner jeweiligen inneren Haltung entsprechen." 
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In an assessment of these wrestlings it is important to keep in clear 
focus the tension between what appears to be the original utterances of 
Qoheleth and those of his more pious, less audacious and less question-
ing editors or glossators. This tension replicates the kind of reception 
Qoheleth is apt to have received from some of his pious but benevolently-
minded contemporaries and successors. Orthodox glosses are to be 
found in Qoh 1:1 (melelsJ 2:24b-26d; 3:13, 17; 4:5-6; 7:5-12, 18-19, 
26b; 8:5-6, 12-13; 9: 17-18; 10:8-20; 11 :9-10; 12:9-12a, 13-14. These 
verses should be assigned to another hand not because it is impossible 
that one we call Qoheleth wrote them but because their piety, vocabulary 
and tenor make it more likely that they come from another source. 
Most, but not all, of these passages identified as glosses have already 
been so identified by the commentators. A few comments on them 
therefore will suffice. Qoh 8:5-6 seems best understood as the explicit 
drawing out on the part of an editor of a teaching already implicit in 
Qoh 3: 1-15. Qoheleth, in my judgment, was willing to let his hearers 
draw the implications of his teaching for themselves. The editor or 
glossator here was not content to let the implication of the master 
remain in its subtler fashion. Qoh 10:8-20, on the other hand, contains 
proverbs of a more traditional sort which Qoheleth may have assembled 
but probably did not himself write. 
The form-critical task of differentiating between glosses and the 
original author is of considerable theological significance, for precisely 
in the glosses we may observe the disagreements and tensions which the 
inheritors of the text of Qoheleth felt with their predecessor. 6 Even 
though it is frequently a matter over which uncertainty reigns, it is 
hermeneutically and theologically important for the exegete to continue 
to struggle with the question or probable historical date and background 
of the biblical utterances under review. 7 The alternative would be to 
surrender to the notion that the cultural matrix in which the Scripture 
arose is a matter of supreme indifference. Insofar as Qoheleth is con-
cerned, it appears most likely, on the grounds of language, priority to 
Sirach, and kinds of political allusions, that Qoheleth wrote during the 
6. It is a great virtue of Childs (1979) that throughout he seeks to remain sensitive to 
the internal tensions within the respective canonical books. 
7. There appears to be a growing sentiment among those scholars concerned to look at 
the canonical and final shape of the biblical books to relegate inquiries into historical 
background to a level of secondary or tertiary importance. It is fair to ask: if one allows to 
fall into relative neglect inquiry into historical context of the biblical traditions, will not an 
ignoring of the contemporary historical context in which interpretation and proclamation 
take place soon follow? 
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reign of Ptolemy IV Philopator (ca. 221-204/3 B.C.E.). 8 Even though the 
exegete may fall into erroneous expositions (should his or her assess-
ment of date or background subsequently be proven to be wrong), the 
worse error would be to attempt to interpret with little or no reference 
to the relation of the biblical author to his or her own cultural 
environment. In any event, the present essay constitutes an investigation 
of one aspect of the intellectual and cultural background of Qoheleth. 
We turn then to an inquiry into the nature and extent of interaction that 
obtained between Qoheleth and the Stoics with respect to physics, logic 
and ethics (section I), sayings on "emptiness" and "breath" (section II), 
and sayings on death (section III). 
The founder of Stoicism, Zeno (ca. 333-261 B.C.E.), son of Mnaseas 
(i.e., Manasseh), was a Phoenician, born in the city of Citium in Cyprus 
(Long, 1974, p. 109; Diogenes Laertius 7, 1, 3). If our dates assigned to 
Qoheleth are correct, the latter was a contemporary of the most prolific 
and influential Chrysippus, a native of Soli or Tarsus in Asia Minor 
who was head of the Stoic school from ca. 232 till his death in 208/ 4 
B.C.E. (Long, 1974, p. 113). No Stoic writings from before the common 
era survive intact. Research is thus forced to rely on reports and quota-
tions found in other ancient writers such as Cicero (ca. 106-43 B.C.E.: 
ND. 2; F.; P.S. and Diogenes Laertius (fl. 200-220 c.E.). Fragments of 
Stoic authors have been conveniently gathered together by Johannes 
Arnim (1903-05). Methodologically it is important to distinguish between 
the teachings of Zeno, common Stoic belief, and the distinctive teachings 
of individual Stoic philosophers. Since Cicero and Diogenes Laertius it 
is common for students of Stoic philosophy to speak of Stoicism in 
general and to identify, where possible and desirable, separate Stoic 
philosophers. For historical purposes all sources must be used with 
caution. In inquiries such as the present one it is especially important to 
remain aware that those passages of Cicero, Diogenes and other writers 
who speak of Stoicism in general may contain assertions not altogether 
reflective of the Stoicism from Zeno to Chrysippus. 
As the studies of Braun, Whitley, Hengel and others have shown, it is 
apparent that the writings of a number of different Greek philosophers 
made at least an indirect impact on Qoheleth. Thus when Qoheleth gives 
8. Whitley's attempt (1979, pp. 136-137) to show Qoheleth's dependence on the 
Aramaic of Daniel is not convincing, and even if it were, it would not be conclusive for, as 
is widely acknowledged, the Aramaic stories of Daniel come from before the Battle of 
Paneas in ca. 200 B.C.E. 
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some prominence to the problem of pain (ma/:1°6(2) and vexation (kacas) 
as he does in the opening chapters of his book (I: 18; 2:23), he is focusing 
also on a major problem of concern to Epicurus.9 Even the cluster of 
alternative solutions which Qoheleth puts forth, of eating and drinking 
and finding pleasure in toil (Qoh 5: 17-19) seem to be mirrored in 
Epicurean maxims on the pursuit of pleasure with moderation. 10 
Similarly, in Qoheleth's affirmation that God has placed severe limits on 
the extent of human knowledge (Qoh 3: 11 ), he displays a deep affinity 
with skeptical philosophers such as Arcesilaus (ca. 318-242 B.C.E.), who 
rigorously attacked the Stoic notion that accurate apprehension was 
possible. 11 As will be seen below, Qoheleth also had an affinity with 
certain other positions of the Cynical philosophers. 
That Qoheleth shares with Greek philosophy presuppositions con-
cerning the make-up of the physical world is apparent from the opening 
chapter, for he alludes therein to the four primal elements which featured 
so largely in pre-Socratic and subsequent Greek cosmology: earth (v. 4), 
fire (=sun, v. 5), air (ruafl: v. 6), water (v. 7). Of the pre-Socratic 
philosophers Qoheleth shows affinities with Anaximander (fl. 546 B.C.E.), 
who perceived the world to have evolved out of the rotary motion of a 
vortex, perhaps with Anaximenes (ca. 550-500 B.C.E.) who perceived the 
primal element to be air-vapor, and especially with Heraclitus (fl. 500 
B.C.E.), whose doctrine of opposites (day-night, summer-winter, war-
peace: Fragment 121 = Diels Fr. 67; Wheelwright, 1964, pp. 102, 106) 
finds a remarkable echo in the famous fourteen opposites of Qoh 3: 1-8. 
Stoic philosophy is divided into three interrelated branches: physics, 
logic and ethics. Even though there is a similarity between Stoic asser-
tions on the circular motion of air (cf. Qoh I :6 and SVF 2. 596), there is 
a sophistication in Zeno and Chrysippus not found in Qoheleth, on the 
arrangement of the elements (in spherical tiers) and on the stability of 
the universe derived from the balance of the pair of light elements (Fire 
and Air) with the pair of heavy elements (Earth and Water) (cf. SVF 
I. 99 and 2. 555). Similarly, Qoheleth's teaching that the generations 
9. For a balanced treatment of Epicurus (ca. 341-270 B.C.E.) on pleasure and pain, see 
Long (1974, pp. 61-69). 
10. "Simple tastes give us pleasure equal to a rich man's diet when all pain of want has 
been removed .... [I]t is not in drinking and continuous parties nor sexual pleasures nor 
enjoyment of fish and other delicacies of a wealthy table which produce the pleasant life, 
but sober reasoning which searches out the causes of every act of choice and refusal and 
which banishes the opinions that give rise to the greatest mental confusion .... Of sources 
of pleasures, the starting-point and the greatest good is prudence." (Letter of Epicurus to 
Menoeceus, pp. 130-132), cited by Long (pp. 65, 67, 69). 
l l. For a discussion of the skepticism of Arcesilaus, see Long (1974, pp. 88-94). 
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come and go "but the earth remains" (lit. "stands": Qoh I :4) appears to 
be close to a teaching attributed by Cicero (N.D. 2. 26) to the Stoics: 
quia et recidunt omnia in terras et oriuntur e terris ("because all things 
both fall back to the earth and arise from the earth"). The Stoics, 
however, developed an eschatology unlike anything found in Qoheleth. 
For the Stoics the world was perishable (phthartos: DL 7. 141) and 
would come to an end in a great conflagration (ekpyrosis) similar to the 
one taught by Heraclitus. 12 Thus Chrysippus taught that not Earth is the 
element which persists forever, but Fire (SVF2. 413). Further, as noted, 
Fire and Air are combined into pneuma (="wind, spirit or gas"). 13 
Different proportions of the blending or mixtures of Fire and Air 
account for the differences between soul of the animal, plant, stone, etc. 
(SVF 2. 716). Apart from Qoh 3:19-21 it does not seem evident that 
much of this conceptualization inheres in Qoheleth's understanding of 
rual;z or hebe/. 
A major feature of Stoic physics is the notion of causation. All things 
are determined by the active principle which bears various labels: 
pneuma, universal logos, uncreated and imperishable Nature, and God. 14 
A distinction is drawn between a principal and perfect cause, on the one 
hand, and proximate or auxiliary causes, on the other (Cicero, De Fato 
18. 41-42). The operation of the principal and perfect cause, which 
some of the Stoics also call Fate, is comparable to Qoheleth's under-
standing of divine causation (Qoh 3: II; 7: 13). For Chrysippus human 
response to the principal cause was not determined. The principal cause 
makes an impression on a person as an agricultural roller impresses the 
earth, but the nature of the response to the impression is up to the 
individual. Stoic physics and ethics thus leave room for diversity of 
human response within the framework of a determinism. Similarly, 
Qoheleth assigns a primacy to the divine causation but allows, as in the 
catalogue of seasons (Qoh 3: 1-8), that there are some things over which 
human beings do have control, such as the decision of when to plant, 
when to weed, when to embrace and when to refrain from embracing, 
when to keep and when to cast away (vv. 2b, Sb, 6). For Qoheleth as 
well a superior and divine causation is operative ( Qoh 3 :9-15), but this 
does not altogether nullify or cancel out human initiative. 
12. For further discussion on this subject, see Hahn (1977, pp. 185-199, 260-266). 
13. Long suggests that the best translation of the Stoic pneuma is "gas" (1974, p. 156). 
14. See Long (1974, pp. 163-170) and Sambursky (1959, chs. 1-2) for further discus-
sion. An important aspect of Stoic physics is its notion that tension (tonos) is innate to air 
and fire endowing them with cohesion; see Sambursky (1959), pp. 5, 25). 
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Even though the determinism in Qoheleth and the Stoics is not 
unqualified, the cyclical, repetitive nature of events in both is equally 
plain. Thus Qoheleth can say: 
What has been is what will be, 
and what has been done is what will be done; 
and there is nothing new under the sun. 
Is there a thing of which it is said, 
"See, this is new"? 
It has been already, 
in the ages before us. (Qoh 1:9-IO: RSV) 
This teaching is echoed in the following more philosophical, Stoical 
reflection: 
If there could be any man who perceived the linking of all causes nothing 
would ever deceive him. For whoever grasps the causes of future events 
must grasp everything which will be .... The passage of time is like the 
unwinding of a rope, bringing about nothing new. (SVF2. 944; tr. Long) 
Logic, the second main branch of the Stoic philosophy, was fully 
developed by Chrysippus (see esp. Mates, 1953). This branch includes 
not only what we today call logic but also other disciplines having to do 
with the logos (i.e., word, speech or reason) such as rhetoric and 
grammar. Qoheleth remains by and large untouched by Stoic logic. He 
does, however, employ the form of the Stoic diatribe, including the 
rhetorical question (2:2, 15, 19, 25; 3:9, 21, 22; 4:5, I I; 5: IO [Engl. 5: I I]; 
6:8 [bis], ll:I2 [bis]; 7:13, 16, 17; 8:1 [bis], 4, 7; 10:10, 14) and, as we 
shall see below, Qoheleth also fully explores the connotations of key 
terms such as did Stoic philosophers of language (see esp. DL 7. 62). 
Stoic ethics sharply distinguishes between the wise and the foolish, the 
good and the bad. Although such a marked dichotomy is to be found 
especially clearly in the glosses to the book of Qoheleth (e.g., 2:26; 3: l 7; 
4:5; 7:9; 8:12-13; 9:17-18; 10:12-15; 12:I4), it is also found in Qoheleth 
proper (e.g., 2:14-17; 4:13; 6:8; 7:4; 7:15; 8:14; 9:1-2; 10:1-2). Further, 
the observation of Qoheleth that he knows the beauty of the seasons 
(Qoh 3: 11) is remarkably close to the Stoic understanding of the wise 
man: "The sage is defined by his moral expertise. He knows infallibly 
what should be done in each situation of life and takes every step to do 
it at the right time and in the right way" (so Long, I974, p. 205). Thus 
an important characteristic of the Stoic sage is "timely behavior". One 
recent study has put it: "Good timing [is] the point at which the process 
of a man's action meets and coincides with those events which are the 
results of a series of causes called Fate" (Tsekourakis, 1971, pp. 91-92; 
cited by Long, 1974, p. 206). 
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The relative value of wisdom in Qoheleth (cf. Qoh 1:16-18; 2:9-14; 
7:2-4) 15 is approximated but not matched in Stoic philosophy for, on 
the one hand, knowledge is a pure or simple good (DL 7. 98) and, on the 
other hand, ordinary learning or education is said to be both serviceable 
( D L 7. 129) and unserviceable ( D L 7. 32). Qoheleth nowhere extols 
without qualification the value of knowledge and wisdom. 
Envy in Stoic ethics is one of several species of forms (eide) of grief 
(lype: DL 7. 1 l I) whereas in Qoheleth envy is rather sardonically (and 
not altogether negatively) viewed as a prime source of human toil and 
effort (kisrfm, lit. "profit, prosperity": Qoh 4:4). Joy in Stoic ethics is 
viewed as something transitory, like a walking exercise, whereas the 
virtues are considered to be abiding (DL 7 98). Qoheleth similarly 
regards joy as transitory, but he nonetheless enjoins the pursuit of it as a 
relative good bestowed on humankind by God as its lot (Qoh 5: 17-19, 
Engl. 5:18-20; 8:15; 9:9). 
Zeno, who was said to have been "concise of speech" (brachylogos), 
chided his pupil Ariston for discoursing at length (DL 7. 18). The 
incident is reminiscent of Qoheleth's "God is in heaven, you are on 
earth; therefore let your words be few" (Qoh 5:2, Engl. 5:3). The 
valuation of brevity, however, is too widespread in Israelite and ancient 
near eastern wisdom, as well as in Greek philosophy, to argue con-
vincingly in favor of a direct influence in this instance. Similarly, there is 
an association in Stoicism between folly and madness (see esp. Cicero, 
P.S. 4: "every foolish person is mad"). This teaching is echoed in 
Qoheleth where folly (silsJut) and madness (hOllelot) are also linked 
together (Qoh 2:12; 7:25; 10:13). The association, however, is not 
sufficiently specific to permit any claim of direct influence. 
The discussion above has pointed to similarities and some differences 
between Qoheleth and the physics and ethics of the Stoics. Inquiry may 
now be made into the extent of the affinity between Stoicism and the 
sayings of Qoheleth on "vanity" and death. 
II 
Two areas in the investigation in which the Stoics made significant 
and lasting advances were in grammar and the nature of language. 16 As 
Long ( 1974, p. l 38) puts it: "They recognized and named the five 
inflections of Greek nouns and adjectives, and the terms they used 
15. For an excellent treatment of Qoheleth's attitude toward wisdom and its relative 
value, see Loader ( 1979, passim). 
16. For an assessment, see Long. 1974, pp. 131-139. 
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(nominative, accusative, etc.) have become canonical. Equally note-
worthy is their analysis of tenses. Here too they fixed the terms which 
we use (present, perfect, etc.) analysing verbs as a means of signifying 
different temporal relations." An example of Stoic inquiry into language 
relevant for this paper may be seen in the following description of Stoic 
theory found in Diogenes Laertius: 
Verbal ambiguity arises when a word properly, rightly, and in accordance 
with fixed usage denotes two or more different things, so that at one and 
the same time we may take it in several distinct senses: e.g., in Greek, 
where by the same verbal expression (aule tris peptoke) may be meant in 
one case that "'A house three times' has fallen": in the other that '"A 
dancing girl' has fallen" (DL 7. 62; tr. Loeb, slightly modified). 
It cannot be demonstrated conclusively that Stoic theory of language 
affected Qoheleth. It can be, and has been, demonstrated, however, that 
in the instance of the thematic word he!lel Qoheleth the author was not 
only aware of the variety of its connotations but drew upon them all. 17 
Seybold (l 974, col. 336) identified the following primary connotations. 
Insofar as range of meaning ( Wortfeld) is concerned, it is closest to rfq 
"empty" (Isa 30:7), tohu "emptiness, nothingness" (Isa 49:4), seqer "lie" 
(Jer 10:14; Zech 10:2; Prov 31:30), 0iiwen "delusion, illusion, fraud" and 
its respective parallels: siiw "lie, falsehood" (Zech 10:2), li'i° yo Cf/ "to have 
no worth, to be good for nothing" (Isa 30:6; 57:12; Jer 16:19, cp. 
Lam 4:17) and above all rual; (Isa 57:13; Jer 10:14; Qoh 1:14 etc.). Indeed, 
of the range of meaning of rual; (1) "wind, breath, storm", (2) "breath of 
life" (cp. nesiimii), (3) "spirit, animus", (4) "Spirit of God", hebe! includes 
only a part (i.e. I and 2). Accordingly, rual; seldom occurs with the same 
or similar function as hel}el (e.g., Ps 135:17; Job 7:7; Isa 26:18; 41:29; 
Mic2:11; Job 20:3; 15:2; 16:3; Jer 5:13; Qoh 5:15). Indeed hebe/ as a 
whole, having its own peculiar emotive sense, diverges in meaning from 
rual;. 
Insofar as Qoheleth is concerned, it seems to me that Seybold has 
overstated the distance between hel}el and rual). In seven instances the 
word hel}el is followed by the phrase wurecat ruab (Qoh 1:14; 2:11; 17, 
26; 4:4; 6:9) or weracyon rual:i (Qoh 4:16), i.e., a "chasing, grasping after, 
shepherding or herding of the wind". Hel}el may be translated as 
17. Seybold in his article on "he/;!el" ( 1974, col, 340) says: "[Of Old Testament authors] 
Qoheleth makes the most distinctive use of hel;Jel. Its 38 occurrences prove the Leitmotiv 
character of the word (see Loretz 1964, pp. 169 ff.). A comparison with its use elsewhere 
makes it plain that Qoheleth knew and used the entire range of meaning (Schwingkreis ). " 
In the present essay we seek to set forth a sampling of Qoheleth's usage of the term to 
demonstrate the correctness of Seybold's assertion. 
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"(transitory) breath" (so KB; see the LXX of Aquila at Qoh 9:9: atmos) 
or "vanity" (see LXX mataiotes) or "emptiness" (so NEB). It is apparent 
that the author of Qoheleth intends to stress in the passages where heflel 
is linked with re cat/ ra cyan rual:z the "incomprehensible, ungraspable" 
nature of his quest for meaning. Further, heflel, like breath or vapor is 
"fleeting, short-lived, elusive", and hence "soon gone". Thus in a num-
ber of passages any one of the aforementioned adjectives would be fairly 
accurate renderings (e.g., Qoh 1:2, 14; 2:1, 11, 17, 19, 21, 23, 26; 3:19; 
4:4, 7, 8, 16; 5:9; 12:8). This is especially so where the Hebrew heflel with 
a suffix is used as an adjective (6: 12; 7: 15; 9:9). By way of illustration, 
the following translation of Qoh 11 :8b would best seem to capture the 
author's meaning: "Remember the days of darkness, that they will be 
many, (for) everything which comes is soon gone (heflel)." 
The translation of heflel as "incomprehensible, ungraspable, beyond 
grasping (i.e., unanswerable)" is especially appropriate where the author 
poses rhetorical questions the answers to which are beyond his powers to 
reach with a firm conclusion. As examples, see: 
The eyes of the wise man are in his head and the fool walks in darkness, 
but I also know what the one fate is which will happen to them all. And I 
said in my mind it will also happen to me as it happens to the fool and 
why then have I been wise? Do I have an advantage? And I said in my 
mind: This is another instance which is hef]el [i.e., beyond grasping] (Qoh 
2:14-15). 
And who knows whether it will be a wise man or a fool who will rule in all 
my toil with which I have toiled and in which I have been wise under the 
sun? This also is hef]el [i.e., beyond grasping] (Qoh 2: 19; see also 2: 17 and 
6: 11 where the same meaning for he/]el seems appropriate.) 
In at least one instance "breath" or "dark breath" is required by the 
context as a rendering for heflel: "For with a (dark) breath he [i.e., a 
man] comes and into darkness he shall go, and with darkness his name 
shall be covered" (Qoh 6:4). 18 Sufficient examples have thus been cited 
to show that the author is indeed fully cognizant of the range of the 
meaning of heflel and seeks to exploit it. 19 It may now be asked whether 
or not we may see in Qoheleth's Leitmotif on heflel any dialogue with 
Stoicism. 
I 8. Seybold renders this verse similarly, and correctly in my judgment (I 974, col. 340). 
Loader (1979, p. 82) translates: "Its coming is in emptiness"; NEB: "Its coming is an empty 
thing"; RSV: "For it comes into vanity." All three miss the positive meaning of hebe! as 
"breath." Qoheleth's frequent citations of Genesis 1-4 confirm this reading. 
19. Ceresko (1982) has shown Qoheleth's play upon the wide semantic range of yet 
another word, m~ '. 
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The Stoics taught in their cosmology that an infinite "void" or 
"emptiness" (kenon) surrounded the spherical shaped universe (SVF 
2. 535, 539). In their catalogue of dialectical virtues necessary for the 
good life they listed amataiotes, literally "lack of emptiness", or "lack of 
emptyheadedness", as Long (1978, pp. 101-124, esp. p. 108) translates. 
It is conceivable that in the selection of his theme, Qoheleth chose to 
latch on to a notion which would readily be seen by his contemporaries 
knowledgeable in Greek philosophy to be counter to Stoicism and more 
in accord with the Cynics and Skeptics of the Academy. The closest 
parallel to Qoheleth's refrain "All is hel]el" is attributed to the Cynic 
philosopher Monimus (4th century B.C.E.) who, according to the comic 
poet Menander, said: "Everything grasped [by humans] is a delusion" 
(lit. "mist": typhos, DL 6. 83). That Qoheleth might be deliberately anti-
Stoic in his assertions receives some confirmation by the appearance in 
his work of another favorite refrain: "a grasping after the wind." In early 
Stoic epistemology knowledge takes place with katalepsis (lit. "a grasp-
ing") of an impression caused by external objects. 20 Zeno illustrated his 
theory of knowledge with a homey example of an open hand, a partly 
closed hand, a clenched fist and one hand grasping the clenched fist. 
"Grasping" he said is like the third illustration and "knowledge" like the 
fourth (SVF 1. 66; Long, 1974, p. 126; Cicero, A. 2.145). In contrast to 
Stoic teaching Qoheleth, who aligns himself with the Cynics and 
Skeptics, is rather asserting: everything is ungraspable, a grasping after 
wind. 
III 
Stoic philosophy is perhaps closest to Qoheleth in its affirmation of 
the operation of a universal logos, cosmic nature or God. In Stoicism 
the capacities with which a human being is born are understood to be 
"the gift of destiny", i.e., cosmic Nature (SVF 2. 991; see Long, 1974, 
p. 168). For Qoheleth the capacity for joy is a gift from God (Qoh 3:13-
14; 5: 18-19; Engl. 5: 19-20). Similarly, for the Stoics, human beings can 
control their attitudes to happenings caused by fate, but they can do 
virtually nothing to alter its operation (SVF 2. 957; cf. Cicero, F. 18). As 
a dog tied to a wagon which is being pulled in front of him may follow 
willingly or unwillingly, so it is with human beings. 21 So also for 
Qoheleth the human being is powerless to alter the work of God (Qoh 
20. For helpful discussions of the development of this subject, see Long (1974, pp. 123-
131; 1978, pp. 101-124), F. H. Sandbach (1971, and Von Staden (1978). (I am indebted to 
my colleague, Christopher Hernandez, for the last mentioned reference.) 
21. This famous illustration is attributed to both Zeno and Chrysippus (SVF 2. 975). 
For a discussion, see Stough (1978). 
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3:14; 7:13). In another respect Qoheleth is similar to the Stoics, namely, 
in his view of death as something given, as a part in an overall pattern of 
life which has its appropriate and even beautiful time (Qoh 3:2, 11; see 
also Benz, 1929, and Crenshaw, 1978). The Stoics, however, were more 
consistent (and accepting) in their attitude toward death than Qoheleth 
was. It will be worthwhile to examine some of the reasons which 
underlie this divergency. 
At least six reasons may be put forward to explain why Qoheleth and 
the Stoics, on the one hand, are in such concord in their view of death as 
something given, and on the other hand, so markedly different. First, 
even though both the Stoics and Qoheleth differentiate between the sage 
and the foolish, the virtuous (or righteous) and the wicked (cf. Qoh 7:4-
5, 14 and Cicero, P.S., passim), the Stoic canons of excellence for the 
sage and virtuous man to attain were so lofty that, as Long (1974, 
p. 207) put it, "Stoic philosophers themselves did not pass the examina-
tion and knew of none who had done so." Qoheleth has a similar 
teaching: "Surely there is not a righteous man on earth who does good 
and never sins" (Qoh 7:20), but Qoheleth obviously does not distance 
himself psychologically from the wise and the righteous (see esp. 2: 14-
15). He rather presupposes that he is among them. Otherwise it is 
difficult to explain why he is so galled that "one fate" (miqreh ~e/:liid 
death) awaits both wise and foolish (Qoh 2:14-19; 9:1-6). 
Second, there is nowhere to be found in Qoheleth a teaching com-
parable to the Stoic doctrine of the equality of sin. In this doctrine one 
falsehood is not more false than another, one deceit is not more deceitful 
than another and one sin is not more sinful than another (DL 7. 120; 
Cicero, P.S. 3). The practical effect of this doctrine is virtually to 
remove from consideration a comparison between wise and foolish, 
good and wicked, on any other than a theoretic plane. "In Stoic ethics a 
miss is as good as a mile" (Long, 1974, p. 207). Long (1974, p. 204) 
explains: "The minute element of disharmony present in a man who has 
nearly reached the top is sufficient to disqualify anything that he does 
from the accolade of virtue. " 22 In contrast, see Qoh 7: 16, a passage out 
of which scholars have never known quite what to make: "Be not 
righteous overmuch and do not make yourself overwise." 23 Regardless 
of our uncertainty as to the precise meaning of this verse, it is plain that 
22. For an even more detailed discussion of the Stoic doctrine that all sins are equal. see 
Rist (1969, pp. 81-96). Rist seeks to make this difficult doctrine more understandable by 
relating it to Stoic physics and the doctrine of tensional movement. 
23. For a helpful discussion on this enigmatic passage, see Whybray (1978). Whybray 
argues convincingly that Qoheleth is not commending here a golden mean but warning 
against self-righteousness and pretentiousness in wisdom. 
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Qoheleth is not commending without qualification a counsel of perfec-
tion such as the one espoused by the Stoics. Further, for Qoheleth the 
difference between righteous and wicked was not only a matter about 
which distinctions could be made in theory; the differences for him were 
real, and sufficiently observable so that when death seemed to cancel out 
the differences, it troubled him deeply. 
Third, the observations of Qoheleth on human memory caused him to 
doubt the extent to which the wise man and fool would in fact be 
remembered. Both, he held, would be forgotten (Qoh 2:16; 9:5; cf. 1:11). 
The significance of this teaching can be seen especially clearly when it is 
contrasted with Stoic optimism that the praise and fame of those who 
strove for good would not perish. Cicero (P.S. 2. 18) eloquently records 
it: "Mars terribilis est eis quorum cum vita omnia exstinguuntur, non eis 
quorum laus emori non potest" ("Death is terrible for those for whom 
all things are extinguished upon losing life but not for those the praise of 
whom cannot be put to death"). In denying that remembrance of the 
wise would endure, is it possible that Qoheleth is deliberately denying 
more optimistic affirmations such as those made by the Stoics? To this 
question we shall return. 
Fourth, in Stoic ethics (on which see our fifth reason below), as in the 
orthodox, Israelite sapiential teaching (see Proverbs 10-15), the righ-
teous would be rewarded and the wicked would be punished. Thus the 
Stoics (Cicero P.S. 2. 19) asserted: "Whereas there can be no well-being 
for any wicked, foolish or idle person, so it is impossible for any good 
and brave and wise man to be miserable." Qoheleth, however, protested; 
for him such was the case neither in life (Qoh 6: 1-5; 9: 11) nor in death 
(Qoh 6:6; 7: 15; 9: 12). 24 He simply does not accept the notion that virtue 
is its own reward and vice its own punishment. Such teaching is 
incipient in the biblical wisdom literature from the Psalms through 
Proverbs and Job. It is a teaching not far below the surface of some of 
the maxims collected by Qoheleth (see Qoh 10:8-11 ). Qoheleth stops 
short, however, of exploring this idea. That accomplishment fell to 
Sirach a generation later who developed it most fully in Sirach 14:3-10 
(see Crenshaw, 1975). 
Fifth, in Stoic ethical theory untoward events were interpreted optimis-
tically because they were viewed not from the limited perspective of the 
part, but from the more universal perspective of the whole (see Long, 
24. That Qoheleth protested, like the author of the book of Job, the inadequacies of the 
orthodox Israelite doctrine of retribution is widely known and has been written on at 
length. See, e.g., Rankin (1954, pp. 93-97), Rylaarsdam (1946, pp. 74-98) and Tsevat 
(1966). 
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1974, pp. 169-174). Qoheleth's avowal that the divine workings are past 
searching out (3: 11) seems to cut short his probings in that direction. 
Even though the divine has implanted hiicO/iim in the human mind, 
precisely because of human lack of knowledge, it would seem, Qoheleth 
does not invite his readers to observe the passing human scene sub 
specie aeternitatis, nor does he urge that they assume the perspective of 
a higher good (such as is found, e.g., in Romans 8:35-39). Thus, 
Qoheleth does acknowledge that death is but a part of an overall pattern 
of times and seasons ordained by God (Qoh 3: 1-15; cf. 8:5), but he does 
not advise that one make it a matter of practice conceptually to view all 
events in the light of the whole. 
A sixth and final reason may be given which helps to explain why 
Qoheleth could on the one hand come so close to a view of death 
compatible with Stoicism and then turn so vehemently to protest against 
it. As noted above, one of the three main branches of Stoic inquiry was 
logic. One of the requirements of logic is that one should seek to bring 
various parts of one's reasoning into harmony and non-contradiciton 
with other parts (see DL 7. 62-83). It is evident that Qoheleth felt no 
such pressure to evolve a theological-philosophical system brought into 
consistency with the aid of logic. 
Having thus set forth reasons for the divergency of Qoheleth from 
Stoical teaching on death despite his agreement in one important 
instance with it, we may now turn to inquire about the extent to which 
Qoheleth may or may not have been influenced by Stoics in his 
formulations on death. 
I. Even though in one instance (Qoh 3:1 15) our author is in accord 
with Stoic teaching on death as part of a larger, divine pattern, no 
convincing case may be made to posit Stoic influence. The long-lived 
Stoic philosopher Cleanthes (ca. 331-232 B.C.E.) wrote a treatise Peri 
chronou ("Concerning Time": DL 7. 174); but in the light of the 
discussion of Diogenes Laertius of the Stoic conception of time as 
"incorporeal" and "the measure of the world's motion" (DL 7. 141), it is 
apparent that Qoheleth has drawn from different sources, less abstract, 
less physical and more oriented to the common occurrences of everyday 
life. 25 There are indeed far closer affinities between Qoheleth's observa-
tions on the times and seasons in Israelite sources such as Ps 1:3: "he 
25. For a similar judgment on the more pragmatic nature of Qoheleth vis a vis Greek 
philosophy, see the posthumously published essay by Albright ( 1972, esp. pp. 234-239). (l 
am indebted to A. R. Ceresko for this reference.) Even though Albright favors a date for 
Qoheleth two centuries earlier than l, and even though he accentuates the interplay 
between Qohcleth and earlier Phoenician intellectual tradition more than I do, he 
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[the one who meditates on the law] is like a tree ... that yields its fruit 
in due season" and Gen 8:22: "While the earth remains, seedtime and 
harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and night, shall not 
cease. " 26 
2. We have already noted that Qoheleth was in all probability a 
contemporary of the most prolific and influential Stoic philosopher, 
Chrysippus, who led the school from ca. 232 to his death in 208 B.C.E. 
Further, we know from Diogenes Laertius that the Stoic philosopher 
Sphaerus (fl. ca. 220 B.C.E.) expounded the Stoic doctrine of a "grasped 
impression" in the court of Ptolemy IV Philopator (DL 7. 177) and 
wrote, among other treatises, Peri doxes ("Concerning Fame") and Peri 
thanatou ("Concerning Death": DL 7. 178). The contents of these 
treatises has been lost, but we may safely conclude that in at least a few 
instances the writings of Sphaerus developed his subject along the lines 
indicated above. Whether or not Qoheleth had direct knowledge of 
Sphaerus' treatises is beyond our ability to establish. We may take it as 
probable, however, that the educated son of David in Jerusalem was 
not unfamiliar with the main tenets of Stoicism as taught by Zeno, 
Cleanthes, Chrysippus and Sphaerus-either mediated to him directly 
through writings or translations thereof, or through Hebrew and 
Aramaic renditions of excerpts carried to him in correspondence from 
compatriots-most likely from friends in the sizeable Jewish community 
in Alexandria. 27 Thus Qoheleth asserts that after death the remembrance 
(i.e., fame) of the wise will be forgotten (Qoh 2:16; 9:5; cf. 1:11). It is 
plausible to conjecture that Qoheleth was deliberately arguing against a 
known Stoic position. (For the relevant quotation, see the third reason 
above.) 
3. Similarly it may be argued that when Qoheleth in the course of his 
work expresses dismay over the same fate which would befall the wise 
and the foolish (Qoh 2:15-17; 9:1-2), he is doing so precisely because he 
considered it worthwhile to explore similarities and differences between Qoheleth and 
Greek intellectual development. Ceresko observed to me after having read this essay: 
"Some of his [ Albright's] remarks touch on topics you do in surprisingly similar ways." 
26. For citations of possible Egyptian sources of Qoh 3:14, see Loretz (1964, pp. 66-69). 
27. On the sizeable Jewish population in Alexandria, see esp. Tcherikover (1959) and 
Hengel (1974, vol. I, pp. 6-57). 
The presence of a form of Stoicism among influential persons at the court of the 
Ptolemies dates back at least to Ptolemy III Euergetes (ca. 247-221 B.C.E.). Eratosthenes (ca. 
276-194 B.C.E.), the eminent chronographer and head of the library at Alexandria, had been 
a pupil of Ariston of Chios, the hybrid Stoic-Cynic, as well as of Arcesilaus, the Skeptic. 
The head librarians were, as a matter of course, tutors of the crown prince. See Peters 
( 1970, pp. 116, 194, 377) and especially Fraser ( 1972, vol. I, pp. 480, 485). 
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has refused to ingest the lofty Stoic definition of the good man and the 
more theoretic Stoic doctrine of sin that no sin is worse than another. 
(For discussion see the first and second reasons above.) 
Conclusions: In the discussion above in this section we have set forth 
reasons why Qoheleth ended up espousing a different attitude and stance 
toward death than the Stoics even though he was in agreement with 
them on one respect, viz., that it was a part of a larger pattern. In three 
counts, as we have shown, the differences may plausibly be seen not 
simply as differences but as deliberate, anti-Stoical arguments. 
The present inquiry has thus examined the subject of certain affinities 
between Stoicism and Qoheleth. We may conclude that the Stoics, along 
with other Hellenistic philosophies, had an impact on the ancient 
Israelite sage, not only in specific teachings of divine causation, the 
cyclical nature of events, the relative value of educationiwisdom, etc., 
but also in form of argumentation and, because of its advanced 
philosophy of language, possibly also in making Qoheleth more sensitive 
to the range of connotations in his use of terms such as heflel. In 
Qoheleth's reflections on death the influence of Stoicism is less traceable, 
yet even here his stance appears to be deliberately anti-Stoic as it also 
does with respect to the sage, sin, enduring fame, and the possibility of 
firmly grasping knowledge or impressions. 
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